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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
I.

Are grades speech protected by the First Amendment?

II.

If so, does the doctrine of academic freedom extend to the university or the professor?

i

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING
Petitioner, who was defendant-appellee below, is the College of Southern Pemberley
(“CSP”).
Respondent, who was plaintiff-appellant below, is Elizabeth Bennet.
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JURISDICTION
The court of appeals entered judgment on June 5, 2014. R. 21. Petitioner filed its Petition
for Writ of Certiorari on June 24, 2014. R. 23. This Court granted the petition on October 15,
2014. R. 24. This Court’s jurisdiction rests on 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) (2012).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A district court’s fact findings and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from them are
reviewed for clear error. Its legal conclusions are reviewed de novo.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in pertinent part:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of
the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of
grievances.
U.S. CONST. amend. I
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in pertinent part:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside. No state
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens
of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1

vii

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
After earning her Ph.D. in English literature, Elizabeth Bennet was hired by the College
of Southern Pemberley beginning the fall semester of 2008. R. 3. Bennet quickly endeared
herself to students, who nominated her for teaching awards in 2009 and 2010, before winning the
award in 2011. R. 3. The fact that Bennet’s class on author Jane Austen became the most popular
course at CSP reflects her popularity as a professor and aptitude for teaching. R. 3.
In the spring of 2013, Bennet’s Jane Austen class included a student-athlete, Mr.
Wickham, who transferred to CSP in the fall and joined the school basketball team. R. 3.
Wickham’s athletic ability propelled the team to several achievements, including an invitation to
a national tournament. R. 3. Outside of Bennet’s classroom, Wickham and CSP garnered
unfavorable media attention. The local newspaper reported that Wickham was compensated in
special treatment by CSP. Wickham was handed senior-only housing, excused from two
midterms and the school dean ordered all of his absences excused, including the ones unrelated
to the basketball team. R. 3.
Wickham’s exemplary athleticism was countervailed by poor academic performance.
Wickham missed more than half of Bennet’s classes and his final paper on Pride and Prejudice
was riddled with misspellings, incorrect grammar, and factual errors. R. 4. Bennet concluded that
Wickham did not read the novel, and assigned a failing grade. R. 4.
Pemberley division athletic rules prohibit a student athlete from school sponsored
athletics if the student has a failing grade on his or her transcript. R. 4. Bennet was ordered by
CSP to change the grade to a “B” so that Wickham would be eligible to play in the invitational
tournament. R. 4. Explaining that Wickham’s academic performance was inadequate to receive
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any grade higher than an “F”, Bennet refused to change the grade, and thus endorse CSP’s lack
of integrity and preferential treatment of a student athlete. R. 4. As a result of refusing to change
the grade, Bennet was terminated from her teaching position at the end of the semester. R. 4.
Bennet brought a §1983 action, seeking an injunction requiring CSP to re-hire her and
monetary damages in the District Court of the Southern District of Pemberley. R. 4; 42 U.S.C.A.
§1983 (West 2012). In her complaint, Bennet alleged that by terminating her employment for
refusal to change the grade, CSP violated her rights to free speech and due process under the
First and Fourteenth Amendments. U.S. CONST. amend. I; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The
district court granted CSP’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted. R. 13. While the district court acknowledged that grades constitute speech for
purposes of the First Amendment, the ownership of that speech ultimately lies with the college.
On appeal, the Sixteenth Circuit reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding that grades are
symbolic speech deserving of first amendment protection. R. 20-1. CSP then filed a petition for
writ of certiorari, which was granted on the following two questions: (1) are grades speech
protected by the First Amendment, and (2) if so, does the doctrine of academic freedom extend
to the university or the professor. R. 24.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
I
This Court should hold for Bennet, because (1) a grade is speech protected by the First
Amendment, and (2) compelled speech violates the First Amendment. A letter grade assigned by
a professor is speech under the first amendment doctrine of symbolic communication. An
academic grade satisfies this Court’s test for a constitutionally protected symbol: (1) it conveys a
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particularized message, and (2) there is a high probability that it will be understood by its
audience. Grades communicate a message equivalent to the writing of a formal, qualitative
evaluation. Additionally, grades are quickly understood by all in the academic community.
Bennet is the speaker of the grade, and as such, she deserves protection from compelled speech.
Under the First Amendment, Bennet enjoys the right to choose and control the content of her
message, and her right was infringed when CSP compelled her to change her message.
II
This Court should hold for Bennet, because (1) the doctrine of academic freedom favors
educational pursuits over mere athletic competition, (2) CSP failed to provide justification for its
conduct, and (3) proper assessment cannot be achieved by administrative action. The policy
concerns of academic freedom stress the essentiality of education to a democratic state, and in
particular the doctrine enshrines professors as vital to the incubation of societal advancement.
Bennet complied with all university standards and policies when she assigned the grade. Under
an academic freedom framework, Bennet’s academic rights outweigh CSP’s athletic rights.
Academic freedom extends protection on academic grounds, and CSP failed to provide a
legitimate academic interest when it compelled Bennet to change the grade. Furthermore, the
assignment of grades requires a synthesis of direct, empirical, and professional observation that
cannot be achieved through bureaucratic decision-making. Professors are the only individuals
qualified to render accurate evaluations.
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ARGUMENT
I.

GRADES ARE A FORM OF SYMBOLIC COMMUNICATION, AND
THEREFORE THEY ARE A PROTECTED FORM OF SPEECH

Constitutionally-protected speech is a multi-dimensional concept. The Courts have heeded
the First Amendment’s underlying values and concerns in order to protect the free expression of
ideas in a variety of manifestations. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) (holding that
the First Amendment protects the right to silence); Spence v. Wash., 418 U.S. 405, 410, 411
(1974) (holding that the First Amendment extends protection to symbolic activity). Regardless of
the venue or the content, constitutionally protected free speech is a sacred tenant of American
society, and deserves serious attention. See Parate v. Isibor, 868 F.2d 821, 830 (6th Cir. 1989)
(holding that a professor’s assignment of grades deserves “exacting First Amendment scrutiny”).
The cornerstone of our educational system is the professor, who is entrusted to train, and
evaluate tomorrow’s leaders. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957) (discussing
how professors play a “vital role” in society because they “train our youth”). In order for our
nation to remain on the cutting edge of industry and science, our educational system depends on
the freedom to educate and evaluate students honestly, openly and freely. Id. at 250 (stating that
professors must remain free to evaluate in order for students to acquire “new maturity and
understanding”). Essential to the efficacy of our nation’s professors is their ability to educate and
evaluate without the fear of unjustified infringement. Id. at 250 (warning that imposing a “strait
jacket” of restrictions on professors would endanger the “future of our Nation”).
A. Grades are symbolic speech under this Court’s holding in Spence
The grades assigned by a professor merit constitutional protection based on their status as
symbols. As a symbol, the letter grade is subsumed under the first amendment doctrine of
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symbolic communication. In Spence v. Washington, this Court defined the two elements of
symbolic communication: (1) the transmission of a particularized message, and (2) where there is
a high probability that the message will be understood by its audience. Spence v. Wash., 418 U.S.
405, 410, 411 (1974). In Spence, this Court applied the doctrine to protect an individual who
attached a peace sign to an American flag. Id. at 406. This Court reasoned that a clear message
was intended by deliberately joining the two symbols. Id. at 410. Likewise, the Spence test can
be applied to the present case to protect Bennet’s act of symbolic communication in assigning a
particular grade.
i.

The First Prong: Grades communicate a particularized message

In Spence, this Court applied a two-prong test for the determination of symbolic
communication. Id. at 410-11.The first prong of the Spence test defines symbolic communication
as the intent to convey a particularized message. Id. at 410. When Bennet assigned a grade of “F”
to Wickham, the grade contained a particular message and subject. The grade was not a general
statement intended for a general audience, but rather, when viewed in its academic context, the
grade conveyed a message highly particularized to a specific situation.
In addition to the particularized nature of the grade, the doctrine of symbolic communication
requires that the symbol act as a message. Id. at 411. This component can be construed as a
requirement that the symbol impart relevant and applicable information in a given context. See
id. at 410. Bennet’s purpose in assigning an “F” was to convey the message that Wickham failed
to display the requisite degree of academic competency in her course. R. 4. Both the grade
assigned by Bennet and the flag in Spence were symbols, since both were intended to convey a
particularized message.
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ii.

The Second Prong: A grade’s message will be understood by those who view it

The second prong of the Spence test requires a high probability that the message will be
understood by its audience. Id. at 411. In Spence, the symbolic meaning of a peace sign on the
American flag carried a highly charged message given its historical and political context, and the
significance of its message would have been recognized by those who viewed it in context. Id. at
410. The letter grade assigned by Bennet was equally informed by the setting in which it
occurred, and carried a highly charged meaning to the academic community. R. 4.
The grading system tends to act as a common language shared throughout the academic
community, and the final letter grade provides the bedrock of that language. While universities
may implement various grading policies, there is broad agreement on a grade’s value.
Institutions of higher learning are nearly unanimous in their recognition of an “A” as the highest
level of evaluation possible and an “F” as indicative of “failing”. Variance in grading standards
amongst universities do not radically affect the fundamental significance of a grade’s value. The
grade Bennet assigned to Wickham would have been easily understood in spite of minor
variables in grading practices.
iii.

Parate extends the doctrine of symbolic communication to the academic setting

In Parate v. Isibor, the Sixth Circuit recognized that the doctrine of symbolic communication
provides constitutional protection to a professor’s right to assign grades. Parate v. Isibor, 868
F.2d 821, 828 (6th Cir. 1989). The court reasoned that a professor communicates a “message to
the recipient” by assigning a letter grade, and that the final letter grade is nearly identical to a
“formal written evaluation”. Id. at 827. The Parate court concluded that a professor’s assignment
of grades is entitled to first amendment recognition and consideration. Id. at 827.
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Based on the two-prong test for symbolic communication applied in Spence and the Parate
court’s recognition of a grade’s first amendment significance, this Court should hold that a grade
is a form of symbolic speech, and therefore receives first amendment protection.
B. Compelled speech is a violation of the First Amendment
Bennet’s first amendment right to free speech was violated when CSP compelled her to
change the grade. This Court has held in several prior cases that interfering with the content of a
speaker’s intended message is an unconstitutional act of compelled-speech. Hurley v. Irish-Am.
Gay, 515 U.S. 557, 559 (1995); Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Util. Com., 475 U.S. 1, 20-21
(1986); Miami Herald Pub. Co., Div. of Knight Newspapers, Inc. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258
(1974). The Sixth Circuit has extended this doctrine to protect a professor’s assignment of
grades. Parate v. Isibor, 868 F.2d 821, 828 (6th Cir. 1989).
i.

The First Amendment protects the right to select a message’s content

This Court has recognized that the First Amendment protects a speaker’s right to choose and
control the content of his intended message, and remain free from compulsion. In Hurley v. IrishAmerican Gay, this Court noted that the First Amendment protects the speaker’s privilege to
select the content of his message. Id. at 573. The Hurley court held that a state law requiring
parade organizers to include in a parade a message they did not agree with violated their first
amendment right to control the content of their message. Id. at 581. In Miami Herald Publishing
Co. v. Tornillo, this Court held that compelling newspaper editors to publish replies
compromised the newspaper’s right to control its message. 418 U.S. at 258. In Pacific Gas &
Elec. Co. v. Public Util. Comm’n of Cal., this Court held that a utility company’s practice of
including newsletters in their billing envelopes was protected speech, and that a state mandate
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compelling them to include a third-party newsletter violated the utility company’s first
amendment right to control the content of its message. 475 U.S. at 20-21.
In the case at bar, Bennet has a first amendment interest in the message she sent by assigning
a particular grade to Wickham. The record reveals that Bennet adhered to all university standards
and policies in her grade assignments. R. 12. CSP would not have committed an infringement
had the administration merely exercised its authority to assign Wickham a new grade. Parate,
868 F.2d at 829. Instead, CSP compelled Bennet to change the grade, and thus alter the content
of her message. R. 4. In essence, Bennet was ordered to say something she did not believe to be
true. As recognized by this Court, Bennet enjoys the right to freely choose and control the
content of the message in her grade assignments.
ii.

Parate protected a professor from compelled speech

The Sixth Circuit extended the First Amendment’s guarantee to control a message’s content
to a professor’s assignment of grades. Parate v. Isibor, 868 F.2d 821 (6th Cir. 1989). In Parate,
the Sixth Circuit reasoned that a university would “severely burden” a professor’s “protected
activity” in assigning grades by compelling the professor to change a grade. Id. at 828.
Furthermore, the court stated that by compelling Parate to change a grade, the university
committed an unconstitutional act of compulsion that “precluded him from communicating” his
particular message to the student. Id. at 829. The Sixth Circuit concluded that such an act of
compulsion was “unduly burdensome” as well as “constitutionally infirm”. Id. at 830.
Similarly, Bennet suffered a violation of her first amendment guarantee to choose and control
the content of her message when CSP compelled her to change Wickham’s original grade.
Bennet deliberately and thoughtfully selected the content of her message when she chose to
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assign an “F” grade in response to Wickham’s academic performance. R. 4. Bennet’s first
amendment guarantee was violated by CSP when she was ordered to change the content of her
message.
Therefore, this Court should hold that the First Amendment grants Bennet the right to control
her message, and by compelling her to change the grade, CSP infringed her constitutional
guarantee of free speech.
II. BECAUSE ASSIGNING A GRADE IS SPEECH BELONGING TO THE
PROFESSOR, SUCH AN ACT DESERVES PROTECTION UNDER THE DOCTRINE
OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM
The issue of academic freedom is of particular constitutional significance. Keyishian v. Bd. of
Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (describing the First Amendment’s “special concern” for
academic freedom). Academic freedom is a doctrine engineered by public policy concerns that
aim to promote virtues of excellence in our institutions of higher learning. Id. at 603 (noting how
the “transcendent value” of academic scholarship necessitates “safeguarding academic
freedom”); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957) (warning that without the
freedom of professors to evaluate freely, our society will “stagnate and die”). Professors are
vulnerable, yet indispensable cogs in the educational machine, and academic freedom has been
instituted to shelter them from bureaucratic abuse. Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 262 (describing the
“fearlessness of scholars” as “fragile” and imperative for “fruitful academic labor”).
By granting constitutional protection to an academic grade, this Court would be preserving
the integrity of our educational system. The grading system used throughout our nation’s
universities requires a certain degree of predictability. When a university compels a professor to
change a grade, the grade essentially becomes an expression of something not founded in reality,
and thus injures the integrity and trustworthiness of academic communication. As a consequence,
9

if the university has a reputation of compelling professors to assign high marks to non-deserving
students, then hard-working and talented students would suffer, because potential employers and
graduate programs may view their transcript suspiciously. Allowing a university to compel its
professors to change a grade would discredit our educational system.
This Court should hold that academic freedom vests in Bennet, because doing so would be
consistent with the policy concerns of previous opinions. The extension of academic freedom to
Bennet is warranted by the fact that (1) accurate academic evaluation can only be achieved
through the professor-student relationship, (2) the need to protect professors in the ethical pursuit
of their educational mission is more important than permitting a university to subvert that
mission for mere athletic competition, and (3) interference from the university without valid
justification creates a mockery of honorable academic institutions.
A.

The doctrine of academic freedom was abused by CSP, and if viewed in context
clearly favors Bennet

In its motion to dismiss, CSP relied on the doctrine of the four essential freedoms as
described in Justice Frankfurter’s concurrence in Sweezy. R. 7 (citing Sweezy v. New Hampshire,
354 U.S. 234 (1957)). The four essential freedoms that appear in Frankfurter’s concurrence
describe the authority vested in a university by the academic freedom doctrine: (1) a university
should remain free to determine “who may teach”; (2) it should remain free to decide “what may
be taught”; (3) it should have the ultimate authority to determine the method in which “it shall be
taught”; and (4) it should remain free to decide “who may be admitted” to the university. Sweezy,
354 U.S. at 263. This Court should reject CSP’s argument based on the four essential freedoms,
because it was interpreted out of context and abused by CSP. R. 15-16. This Court should
observe that when viewed in context, the policy concerns of the four essential freedoms favor
Bennet.
10

i.

The policy behind the four essential freedoms concerns keeping academic pursuits
free from restrictions

The first point to note is that the four essential freedoms are not Justice Frankfurter’s own
words, and are not a creature of judicial invention. Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 262. They were sourced
from a talk given at a scholarly conference in South Africa, which advocated for the “free spirit”
of universities in that country. Id. at 262. The statement quoted in Frankfurter’s concurrence
addressed the urgent need for universities to remain free from church and state coercion, as well
as the sciences’ dependence on free inquiry, and the university’s responsibility to provide a
setting “conducive to speculation”. Id. at 262-63.
When read in context, it is difficult to see how CSP’s actions are consistent with the
statement’s policy concern. Justifying a grade change to keep an athlete competition-eligible on
the notion of free spirit of inquiry insults the noble goals espoused in the quote’s sentiment. CSP
abused these four essential freedoms by stripping them of their original context.
ii.

The four essential freedoms are rooted in academic grounds, and not collegiate
athletics

The second point to note is that the four essential freedoms empower the university only “on
academic grounds”. Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 263. CSP’s motivation for compelling the grade change
was to keep a student-athlete eligible for competition—a motivation hardly considered a valid
academic ground. R. 4. CSP did not express a difference of opinion on Wickham’s performance
or allege that Bennet violated university standards. The record indicates that CSP compelled
Bennet to assign a “B” for the purpose of ensuring Wickham could participate in school athletics.
R. 4. The record also reveals that CSP’s underlying motivation was the desire for increased
enrollment and larger alumni donations. R. 3. These reasons are insufficient to override the right
to free speech vested in a professor as described by the four essential freedoms.
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Therefore, this Court should hold that academic freedom cannot protect CSP’s conduct in
this case, because it did not act with a legitimate academic interest when it compelled Bennet to
change the grade.
B.

CSP failed to provide valid justification for interfering with Bennet’s speech

The Sixth Circuit emphasized that the primary objective of academic freedom is to preserve
the “free marketplace of ideas” and to shield the professor’s teaching method from the
university’s “arbitrary interference”. Parate, 868 F.2d at 830. As noted by the Parate court, the
doctrine of academic freedom promotes the rights of professors to educate and evaluate freely.
Id. at 828. However, the court recognized the inevitable conflict between the professor’s
academic rights, and the university’s right to manage itself. Id. at 830. The conflict of interests
inherent to the academic freedom issue can be resolved through this Court’s balancing test in
Pickering. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). The test considers (1) the
relevant weight of the employee’s right to free speech, and (2) the public employer’s interest in
operational efficiency. Id. at 568. This Court should honor the academic freedom policies set
forth in Parate, and weigh the factors of its Pickering test, and hold for Bennet because her free
speech rights outweigh CSP’s arbitrary interference in the grade change.
In Pickering v. Board of Education, a public high school teacher was terminated from
employment for criticizing school board financial decisions in a newspaper editorial. Id. at 566.
This Court held that public employment may not be terminated as a result of speaking on issues
of public concern unless the employer can show the employee knowingly or recklessly made
false statements. Id. at 574.
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The test applied by this Court in Pickering sought to strike a balance between the teacher’s
right to express his opinion on “matters of public concern” and the school’s interest in
operational efficiency. Id. at 568. Notwithstanding the fact that the present case does not involve
a matter of public concern, the Pickering court provided a valuable balancing test applicable to
the case at bar. Id. at 568. This Court provided the following factors for determining whether the
balancing test would favor the employer: (1) disharmony among coworkers, (2) attacks on
loyalty and confidence, (3) impairment or prevention of regular operation, or (4) failure to satisfy
the employee’s duties. Id. at 570-73.
This Court should note that the factors offered in Pickering are non-existent in the case at
bar, and by applying the test, the balance will clearly strike in favor of Bennet. The record is
devoid of any mention that Bennet’s refusal to change the grade resulted in workplace
disharmony or impaired the university’s ability to execute its daily operations. In light of the fact
that the record lacks reasonable justification for CSP’s actions, Bennet’s right to free speech
remains stronger than CSP’s right to compel a grade change on non-academic grounds.
In Pickering, this Court clearly favored preserving individual free speech rights when the
public employer could not show justifiable grounds for infringement. Id. at 571. As noted by the
Sixth Circuit, the doctrine of academic freedom shields professors from arbitrary interference.
Parate, 868 F.2d at 830. Therefore, this Court should remain consistent with the policy concerns
in Pickering and Parate, and hold for Bennet.
C.

The present case is distinguishable from cases where the courts have held that public
employees speak as proxies of their employers

The argument that professors speak as proxies of the university when assigning grades fails,
because the supporting case law is distinguishable from the present situation. In its motion to
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dismiss, CSP relies on the Third Circuit’s ruling in Brown v. Armenti to argue that Bennet’s
speech is exempt from first amendment protection due to her status as a university agent, and
that the university’s authority to decide how courses will be taught includes the freedom to
assign grades. R. 7-8 (citing Brown v. Armenti, 247 F.3d 69 (2001)). However, this Court should
note that the Brown ruling is merely persuasive authority, and is distinguishable from the case at
bar. The speech of assigning grades belongs to Bennet, because (1) the policy concerns of
academic freedom override the public employee-employer relationship, and (2) a professor’s
duty to assign grades does not inherently interfere with the university’s right to manage itself.
CSP’s reliance on Brown is misplaced because it is distinguishable from the present case.
The Brown court relied on the four essential freedoms listed in Frankfurter’s concurrence to
Sweezy, and concluded that grading is a component of the university’s freedom to determine how
a course will be taught. Brown, 247 F.3d at 75 (citing Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234
(1957)). Brown held that a public entity, such as a university, enjoys discretion in implementing
and enforcing its own academic standards. Brown, 247 F.3d at 73.
This Court should note the distinction between a university’s authority to establish grading
standards, and the professor’s right to assign grades in compliance with those standards. As
recognized by the Third Circuit in Brown, a university is not granted unimpeded authority to
decide each student’s individual grade. See Brown, 247 F.3d at 74. The analysis in Brown merely
posited that a university enjoys the right to create its own grading policies, and it was silent as to
whether an individual professor is granted the right to assign grades within institutionallydefined boundaries. See id. at 75. Therefore, a professor enjoys discretion in assigning grades as
long as she complies with the university’s standards.
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Additional support is found in other courts that drew a clear distinction between grading
policies set forth by university administrators, and individual professors who work within the
administratively-provided framework. Bd. of Curators of Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78,
90 (1978) (comparing a professor’s “expert evaluation” with the inadequacies of “administrative
decisionmaking”); Parate v. Isibor, 868 F.2d 821, 830 (6th Cir. 1989) (noting the difference
between conforming a professor’s “pedagogical style” to university standards and compelling a
grade change against the professor’s “own professional judgment”).
The record indicates that Bennet assigned grades consistent with the policies and standards of
the university. R. 12. The situation would be different had Bennet violated CSP’s grading
policies or contradicted the academic standards desired by the university administration. Parate,
868 F.2d at 829, 830. However, the record is clearly void of any such violation. Bennet’s first
amendment rights in the grade assignment remain intact, because she complied with CSP’s
standards. R. 12. Assigning the “F” grade did not violate any employee-employer rules. Bennet
remained free to assign grades pursuant to her official duties as long as she did so within
institutionally-defined boundaries. This Court can remain consistent with previous decisions, and
hold for Bennet.
Therefore, consistent with the reasoning applied by other courts, Bennet remained free to
submit her professional judgment in a final letter grade as long as she acted within the confines
set forth by CSP.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, this Court should hold for Bennet, because (1) grades are protected by the
First Amendment, and (2) the policies of academic freedom favor Bennet. The letter grade
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assigned by Bennet contained a particularized message that would have been understood by its
audience. Furthermore, her first amendment right to choose and control the content of her
message was infringed upon by CSP’s act of compulsion. The doctrine of academic freedom
aims to promote societal growth through virtuous educational service, and recognizes the
indispensable role professors play in that pursuit. The fundamental policies of the doctrine are
indifferent to student-athletics. The competition-eligibility of a student athlete is simply
irrelevant to the noble intention of academic freedom. Additionally, accurate and honest
evaluations of academic merit can only be achieved through the empirical, observational
approach afforded to professors. An honest academic evaluation cannot be rendered through a
bureaucratic procedure. This Court should recognize a grade’s entitlement to first amendment
protection, heed the policies promulgated by academic freedom, and hold for Bennet.
PRAYER
For these reasons, Respondent prays this Court will affirm the Circuit Court’s decision to
reverse in part, affirm in part, and remand for further proceedings.
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